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Goffman's frame analysis and
modern micro-sociological paradigms*
Jef Verhoeven
Few contemporary sociologists are as creative as Erving Goffman.
One product of this creativity is frame analysis (Goffman, 1974), a
method that is both admired and neglected. Comparing Goffman ' s
approach to other paradigms seems not only to be a negation of the
creativity of this writer, but is strongly disliked by Goffman (1981b)
when such comparisons have nothing but labelling as their purpose.
It is not the function of this paper to place frame analysis in one or
another theoretical pigeon-hole. Frame analysis is a sociological
approach in its own right. Nevertheless, Goffman accepts different
standpoints of symbolic interaction (G.H. Mead), ethnomethod-
ology and phenomenological sociology (A. Schutz) even when he
denies others. I intend here to present the differences and
similarities between Goffman's frame analysis on the one hand, and
Blumer's symbolic interaction, Schutz's phenomenological sociolo-
gy, and Garfinkel' s ethnomethodology on the other hand in
function of three questions. (1) What are the presuppositions in
relation to reality, knowledge, man and society used in the four
paradigms? (2) What is the object of sociology? (3) What are the
methodological principles? Moreover, I want to show that in spite
of different accents, the frame-analysis approach can already be
found in the earlier work of Goffman.
Something must be said about why these four micro-sociological
paradigms have been selected. First, Goffman, although sometimes
nts
his work as different from theirs. Instead of using Mead's work in
this paper, I will use Blumer's (1969a) seminal book, because of its
major influence on symbolic interactionism. l Second, they try to
give an analysis of the `ongoing activity' as it appears `here and now'
and are interested in the interpretation of reality. Third, although
three of them do not limit their interest to the study of micro-
structures, all start by studying face-to-face relations. Fourth, there
is a relationship between Goffman's frame as `the organization of
experience', `the definition of the situation' as used in symbolic
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interactionism, the phenomenological `meaning contexts' and
ethnomethodological `indexicality' and `reflexivity'. Fifth, frame
analysis is considered to be a formal sociology (Jameson, 1976), a
symbolic interactionist approach (Littlejohn, 1977; Glaser, 1976),
ethnomethodological and semiotic (Jameson, 1976) and structural-
ist (Gonos, 1977). Here, frame analysis will be considered as a
special approach and cannot be forced into one of these categories.
Frame analysis in the other works of Goffman
Let us first examine the extent to which the frame analysis approach
is present in Goffman's other works. Although he denotes a great
deal of attention to a sociopsychological problem formulation, the
structures within which the actors move and via which they
approach reality form a substantial portion of his earlier work.
Where does one find evidence for this thesis?
Already in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959),
Goffman wonders what techniques actors use to give others a
specific impression of themselves or of a situation. Instead of
`techniques', one could just as well use the term `frame ' here
('framework of appearances', Goffman, 1959: 242). These
frameworks are outlined in detail in this book and concur with those
of Frame Analysis. However, Goffman still talks in this first book
about the dramaturgic presentation of an activity. Used in this
approach (Goffman, 1959: 8, 17, 107, 112, 70, 175, 176, 141) are
terms such as `concealment, discovery', `performance', `front
region', `backstage', `fabricators', `staging talk', `team collusion'
and `secrets ' .
The anthology, Interaction Ritual (1967), four articles of which
had originally appeared before 1959, also deals with similar
problems. Goffman bases himself here on the study of the social
`gathering', a collection of people who meet each other superficially
at the same place and shortly thereafter leave that place. At the
moment, the members of this gathering try to disclose their
appearance in a particular way, the facial expression being an
important instrument. Goffman (1967: 77) studies how one can hide
or betray one's facial expression, what ritual is used, and what
attitude is adopted or how we behave in order to lead or mislead the
other. The offering of a chair to a visitor, for example, is an
expression of deference. Its meaning can be changed, however,
should one do it brusquely ('demeanour') (Goffman, 1967: 81).
Further, he studies within what frames `embarrassment' occurs
among the actors and what forms of alienation of a situation can be
distinguished (Goffnian, 1967: 97ff., 117ff.). In the longest article,
` Where the Action Is', finally, a keen analysis is given of the `action'
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that can be found in the world of gambling, card playing and sports.
This is a particular form of action: the actor takes risks which flow
from the situation but which actually can be avoided. Goffman
studies here the structures within which the `action ' takes place.
Encounters (1961a) gives the structure in which table games take
form (`Fun in Games'), and how individuals can distance themselves
from the roles they have to play ('Role distance'). Here, too, the
theme of the first book recurs, namely, what individuals want to
manifest of themselves to the other. Much attention is devoted to
the frames which make this possible and which will refer to his
description in Frame Analysis.
This problem can also be found in Asylums (1961b) and Stigma
(1963a): what frames are used there to evaluate the behaviour of
patients in a psychiatric hospital and of people who are stigmatized?
Goffman (1961b: 283, 331) describes how the structure within which
the psychiatric patient and the stigmatized individual act provides
the frames in order to see the social reality in a well-determined
manner.
In Behavior in Public Places (1963b), the face-to-face behaviour
of people in the daily circumstances of the gathering is again central.
This behaviour must be seen within the situation where the
gathering takes place. This means that the actor takes account of the
spatial environment into which he or she steps in order to become
part of a gathering (Goffman, 1963b: 18). The typical characteristics
of these situations impose differing norms on the actors: for
example, how one has to manifest one 's familiarity or unfamiliarity
with someone and where the limits of this behaviour lie (Goffman,
1963b: 112ff.). A number of frames of Frame Analysis are also
found here already, such as `talking to oneself , `delusionary states',
`open regions', `concealment' and `boundary collusion' (Goffman,
1963b: 72, 75, 132, 176, 181).
Strategic Interaction (1969) consists of two important essays. The
first is entitled `Expression Games', and Goffman here searches for
the conditions under which an individual receives, gives or hides
information. For in the encounter with the other, there is always
doubt about what the other really means; it is a kind of game
situation in which one tries to find out what the other really wants to
express. The standpoint is formed by the simple moves of the other
that one tries to understand (Goffman, 1969: 11), for they are
applied by the other to present the reality in a particular manner.
Frames as concealment and fabrication form essential components
of these expression games (Goffman, 1969: 28, 58, 80). The same
can be said about the second essay, which bears the same title as the
book: `Strategic Interaction ' . Here, too, `keying' (Goffman, 1969:
74 Micro-sociological theory
115, 116, 140), `frame analysis', `concealment ' and the like are
mentioned. These frames are used by Goffman to apply a game
theory analysis to the study of strategic interaction. In a strategic
interaction, two parties meet each other in a well-structured
situation. Each party tries to find out what the other party thinks
about him or her. In this way, one tries to foresee what movement
the other party will make in order to adapt one's own movements.
Goffman studies further what frames are used to make possible and
to hinder this strategic interaction.
Finally, frame analysis is not absent from Relations in Public
(1971). The object of the research is the face-to-face behaviour in
daily life: Goffman wants to give a picture of the ground rules and
the behavioural patterns of public life. Via the study of these ground
rules, he again arrives at the frames which help the actors to read
the reality. The manner in which an individual appears in the world
and the territory of the self become comprehensible only through
the frames used. Thus, for example, one uses signs to define one's
territory (Goffman, 1971: 41), but one's territory can also be
removed when one fouls it oneself or when others succeed in
penetrating it (Goffman, 1971: 52, 57). Brief encounters between
people consist of a `supportive' and `remedial interchange'. This
exchange is a kind of ritual that confirms the relations between the
actors or reroutes on a good path those that threaten to become
conflictual. Ritual also plays an important role in the signs that are
used to clarify our bond with others. All these elements allow the
reality to be read as normal or abnormal. The entire series of frames
from Frame Analysis is already provided in Relations in Public
(1971: 113, 140, 211, 269, 284, 314, etc.).
In Gender Advertisements (1976) and Forms of Talk (1981a),
Goffman very definitely applies the frame analysis approach. These
two works were, in fact, published after Frame Analysis. The first
work concerns the manner in which people manifest their sexual
identity to others and how this is used in the world of advertising.
Goffman does this by means of a long series of advertising
photographs, and explains what frames we use to interpret them
(Goffman, 1976: 10-23). The second work deals with linguistic
usage and consists of articles that were written between 1974 and
1980. The frame analysis approach is here applied to the very simple
forms of discussion, response cries, and also to ways of speaking,
lectures and radio talk. Part of this problem has already been
discussed in Frame Analysis (1974: 496-559).
In conclusion, one may state that the frame analysis problem
formulation is a constant motif throughout all of Goffman's work.
Of course, it is not so significant in his earlier work as in Frame
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Analysis and in his later work. Nevertheless, in one way or another,
Goffman is always looking for the frames that we use in order to
answer the question, `what is it that is going on here?' The result is
an unmasking of a socially concealed world. But, in addition, a
world becomes visible that is established in its smallest details. This
will now be examined further.
The world picture
Research cannot be understood apart from the world picture of the
researcher (Strasser, 1973; Radnitzky, 1970). This world picture is
crucial and gives the researcher a particular image of man and
society and the relation between both. The researcher will choose a
particular research programme in function of this view. So the social
world can be considered as a material reality in which different
impersonal powers react upon the material components. There are
also sociologists who consider the social world as peopled by
individuals creating meaning and reacting upon each other. Both
exemplar points of view are applied in sociology and are considered
useful for the understanding of social reality in function of the world
picture practised by the sociologists. World pictures are thus
presuppositions about physical reality, man and society (Radnitzky,
1970: xxviii). Although these hypothesis are of a metaphysical
order, they have a major influence on the research and methods of
sociologists.
What are the world pictures of frame analysis, symbolic interac-
tionism, phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology?
Reality
Goffman (1974: 10) uses a rather ambiguous concept of reality. This
is clear in his definition of the term `strip':
The term `strip' will be used to refer to any arbitrary slice or cut from the
stream of ongoing activity, including here sequences of happenings, real
or fictive, as seen from the perspective of those subjectively involved in
sustaining an interest in them.
Three points must be considered. In the first place, Goffman speaks
of `real or fictive sequences of happening', but both can be real.
`Actions framed entirely in terms of a primary framework are said
to be real or actual, to be really or actually or literally occurring.'
(Goffman,1974: 47.) But even when these actions are keyed, i.e.
transposed into another frame, it does not mean that these actions
are not real. Indeed, the keying actually occurs. What is considered
as real depends on the perspective, either primary or transformed,
from which actions are considered by the actor.
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Reality always appears to the actor from a particular perspective.
This perspective is given by the frames we use, which frames are
seen as particular organizations of experience. In a certain sense, we
can put that reality into a construction by the actors, taking into
account framing, keying and fabrication (i.e. the creation of a `false
belief about what it is that is going on'). But Goffman stresses that it
would be ridiculous to say that reality is totally created by the
actors: reality is also pre-given. It is not sufficient to define
something as a parking place if there is no place at all.
This position is not a break with Goffman's position in his earlier
books. Although he gives a very important place to the idea of the
`definition of the situation', an idealistic stance towards reality, he is
aware of the fact that reality is outside the individual's mind. In view
of the description of encounters, this idea becomes clear (Goffman,
1961a: 27-8). Encounters characteristically produce direct interac-
tion between the participants of the encounters. This does not imply
that these participants create the total reality. Indeed, interactions
take place in a particular historical sequence, which means that
there is already a meaning given to this reality. Moreover, there are
unintended acts that are part of the encounter without constituting
the main parts of the encounter, e.g. coughing and sniffling.
However unimportant they seem to be, they are part of reality,
which is out there.
Third, this perspective on activity is formulated by the individuals
who are interested in what is happening. Reality is thus also
something defined by the actor, which forms the bulk of Goffman's
book, Frame Analysis. Actually, this book is not about the core
concerns of sociology, i.e. social organization and social structure,
but about the `organization of experience - something that an
individual actor can take into this mind' (Goffman, 1974: 13). Every
individual faces the problem of `what is it that is going on?' To
answer this question people apply frameworks. Applying these
frameworks can make experience vulnerable. Indeed, it is possible
that an actor can misframe events.
Reality is thus an outer happening independent of the individual
actor, but it also gets its meaning from the involved individuals,
although they are using pre-given frameworks, keyings, etc., to look
at it.
While Goffman takes reality as it is given to him, Alfred Schutz
starts from the experience that we are put into the world and that we
are intentionally directed towards the world. We are aware of the
'world around us. We fear for, hope and we long for something. This
way we meet our world and realize that it is a pre-given, organized
and intersubjective reality. But as a thinking subject we are aware
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of the act of thinking and consider the `purified sphere of conscious
life'. Therefore, Schutz applies phenomenological reduction to the
objects of thinking, i.e., he puts the existence of the outer world
between brackets. He abstracts from the possibility that the world
could be otherwise than as it appears to us. Schutz is not interested
in the objects as such, but in the objects as they appear to him
(Schutz, 1967: 99-117), so he does not deny the existence of the
world. His interest is rather in the meaning of the world.
Schutz adapts a point of view totally different from Goffman's in
these matters. If Goffman's (1981b: 69) admission that he himself is
moving towards positivism can be considered to be the correct
formulation of what he wants to say, then he does not bracket the
existence of reality. Schutz, on the contrary, sees reality as it
appears to him.
According to Schutz (1967: 208-29, 3-34), as scientists we have to
go back to the pre-scientific reality i.e., the reality that seems
self-evident to people remaining within the natural attitude. For
Schutz this is the reality of the everyday life-world, i.e., `that
province of reality which the wide-awake and normal adult simply
takes for granted in the attitude of common sense' (Schutz and
Luckmann, 1974: 3).
As wide-awake adults we experience this world as pre-given,
intersubjective, and not created by ourselves, except for a small
part. This life-world is not considered to be composed of merely
material objects, but also of `meaning strata which transform
natural things into cultural objects ' .
This everyday life-world is nevertheless more than the sensibly
perceivable world, which was designated by William James as the
paramount reality. This life-world also embraces my fantasies and
dreams, so it is more than the physical world. Reality is thus
constituted by the meaning of our experience rather than by the
ontological structures of objects. We have different finite provinces
of meaning: that of the everyday life-world, of the world of dreams,
of the world of science, etc., which worlds are not necessarily
consistent. Each of these provinces is part of a specific style of lived
experience, i.e., a cognitive style. In the same day, we can change
from one province of meaning to the other. But for Schutz, the
everday life-world or `the world of working' is the paramount reality
from which we start to come to scientific knowledge. In this world,
purposes-at-hand determine the relevancy of the reality under
consideration: it is in this way that we build up a particular province
of meaning. According to Schutz we approach reality by looking at
it from different `frames'.
Like Schutz, Garfinkel (1967: 35) stresses reality as a social
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reality. In his view, people treat `the natural facts of life' as `a real
world and as a product of activities in a real world'. This starting
point for the analysis of social reality is the analysis of the attitude of
daily life as described by Schutz. Thus he agrees with Schutz's
presupposition that for the actor `the objects of the world are what
they appear to be' (Garfinkel, 1963: 210-14). But this social reality
is not just out there. Indeed, the characteristics of the real society
are to a certain extent produced by the persons. Meaning is
furnished by creative actors (Garfinkel, 1963: 214-15; 1967: 122,
53-6). For the ethnomethodologist this is a paradox, but it does not
raise special problems. He should be indifferent towards the problem
of choosing between reality as out there or in people's mind. Indeed,
Leiter (1980: 20-1) contends that ethnomethodology brackets the
existence of the outerworld, as Schutz does.
Contrary to Schutz and Garfinkel, Blumer's (1969a: 21-3)
position does not rely on the intentionality of our thinking. For him,
the exterior world of gestures and acts is reality. We see people
indicating things and we understand the meaning of those gestures.
Perception is a necessary condition of finding meaning in the world,
and this perception is not just a product of a single actor but is an
interplay between the individual and social environment.
Blumer takes an empirical standpoint: reality exists only in the
empirical world. For this reason, he rejects traditional idealism and
realism and cannot accept that reality exists just in human pictures
or conceptions of it. The empirical world can talk back; it is not just
something living in our minds. Nor does this obdurate quality of
reality produce an extreme realism. This is impossible because the
reality - and for Blumer this is social reality - cannot be fixed or
immutable and so it is not to be studied as . would the advanced
physical sciences.
In conclusion, it can be said that Goffman defends a positivistic
position: reality is there for him as researcher. And he accepts that
every actor acts as if there were a correspondence between his
perception and the organization of what is perceived (Goffman,
1974: 26). Instead of using the label `positivism', as Goffman does,
it is perhaps better to speak of naive realism. Blumer (1969a: 68-9)
on the other hand, although speaking of an obdurate reality, states
that objects are real in the sense that people have given meaning to
them. Schutz does not deny reality but puts it between brackets.
This means that because of phenomenological reduction, actors
look for the images they have in their minds. But there too, Schutz
produces a special epoché: a bracketing of the natural attitude.
Actors bracket the fact that the real world is different from the way
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it appears to them (Schutz, 1967: 229; Schutz and Luckmann, 1974:
27). Garfinkel's standpoint can be considered to be the same as that
of Schutz. Although the four paradigms propose a different position
in relation to reality, none of them holds that reality is totally
created by people: it is pre-given.
If reality is seen from different standpoints, the ways to be
followed to attain knowledge are different as well. What different
options are taken?
Since Goffman (1974:10) sees his task as describing the
`frameworks of understanding available in our society for making
sense out of events' and `the special vulnerabilities to which those
frames of reference are subject', he is convinced that, as a
researcher, he can unveil the concealed reality. Let us take
`fabrication' (Goffman, 1974: 83-113). One of the parties involved
in a fabrication is brought to a false belief about what is going on.
The fabricating party knows that it is a fabrication. What is hidden
for the deceived party is not only perceivable for the fabricators but
also for the researcher. But is it not possible that the total act of the
two parties is a benign fabrication for the researcher? This may be,
but ultimately the sociologist will see it. Goffman seems to defend
the classic positivistic stance: `What I see, I see.' A researcher
considers himself the ultimate judge, able to catch social reality. Just
as Goffman supposes that there is a correspondence between the
perception of an individual and the organization of what is
perceived, he holds that a researcher can perceive reality the way it is.
Blumer, on the other hand, puts himself somewhere between an
extreme idealism and a realism that has its roots in physical science.
Thus, experience is the ultimate criterion of knowledge because of
the obdurate character of reality. A sociologist must perceive social
and material reality freed from all theoretical presupposition, and
his . starting point must be perception of outer reality. Even if this
perception is a social act, which means that it is a concatenation of
defining processes made by different actors, Blumer holds that the
actor as well as the researcher has come to the knowledge of the same
reality.
The option taken by Schutz to attain knowledge differs from
those of Goffman and Blumer. Schutz brackets the possibility of
experiencing the world. His starting point is the everyday life-world
of the situated person, who meets that world as organized and
intersubjective. In this everyday life-world, we act and meet the
other in face-to-face relations. That is the place where I meet my
fellow-men (`Mitmensch'). But in many situations, I meet only a
`world of contemporaries' (`Mitwelt'). The only way to grasp this
` Mitwelt' is to use typifications of interactions and motives that are
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built up by using `in-order-to' and `because' motives, which are
reciprocal between the actor and the partner.
Like a partner, a scientific observer does not experience the other
as an actor does in his everyday life-world: he is a disinterested
observer (Schutz, 1967: 245 - 59). As an observer, he does not live in
a we-relation and cannot immediately grasp this life-world. To
bridge this gap, the observer builds types, puppets, that are
compatible with the experience of the everyday life-world. He builds
ideal types that have meaning adequacy and causal adequacy
(Schutz, 1932: 260-61). To accomplish this, Schutz applies the
postulate of subjective interpretation, the postulate of consistency
and compatibility of all propositions, the postulate that all scientific
thought has to be based on tested observation, the postulate of
clarity and distinctness of all terms, the postulate of adequacy, and
several others.
Garfinkel on the other hand takes most of his inspiration from
Schutz's work, so he disagrees with Goffman and Blumer as well in
relation to the question of how to attain knowledge of social reality.
The experience of daily life of the actor is the main starting point for
Garfinkel as for Schutz. The actor behaves in the world as if he
grasps it immediately and as `known in common with others ' . To
attain this common sense knowledge, the actor uses several
presuppositions (Garfinkel, 1963: 210-15), i.e. the reality of the
world as it appears to be, the practical interest of the actor, the time
perspective of daily life, the et cetera assumption, the continuity of
appearances, the commonly entertained scheme of communication,
the reciprocity of perspectives and the form of sociality. And
Garfinkel continues by defining eleven determinations to see an
event as placed in a common-sense environment. Nevertheless,
actors have not to be conscious of these determinants. Indeed, the
more an event is institutionalized the more the actor takes the act
for granted.
According to Garfinkel (1963: 76-103) this common-sense
knowledge is also a substantial part of sociological research. He
contends that the sociologist doing research relies on and cannot
decide about meaning or facts other than by using common-sense
knowledge of social structures. On the other hand, scientific
knowledge does not suffice for action in everyday life, because
scientific theorizing develops according to other principles (Gar-
finkel, 1963: 283).
Conception of man and society
Another part of the world picture dealt with by sociologists and
other social scientists is the conception they have about man and
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society. Depending on the vision they have of man as, for example,
a bunch of nerves or as meaning-creating actor or of society as a
unity in its own right or a collection of individuals, different
methodological approaches are developed in sociology.
Man is considered by Goffman to be a personal ongoing identity,
consisting of flesh, blood, etc. (i.e. animal nature). Thus, man is a
human actor, who stores information in his skull. But this does not
mean that he is just a black box (Goffman, 1974: 524, 513-14).
Placed into time development, he is the self-same object that has a
memory and a biography (Goffman, 1974: 128). As a person, he
fulfils many functions or capacities, i.e. roles. Indeed, Goffman
differentiates between the person (individual, player) and the role
(capacity, function). Although a person's acts are partly a product
of the self - and we can find something of the self behind the roles
- this does not mean that a person has no freedom. The individual
can choose between the total range of actions that are available in
fulfilling his role. Moreover, the claims of the role can be forgotten
by the individual actor, e.g., when a person leaves a conversation to
answer the telephone, or when one is sniffling, coughing, etc., which
is not really a part of one's role in a conversation (Goffman, 1974:
273). In this sense, there is never complete freedom nor complete
constraint between the individual and his role. The individual acting
upon and in the world becomes part of the ongoing world and
cannot be studied independently of that social world. A reduction of
social reality to its component parts is, therefore, unacceptable.
Society, although consisting of intelligent actors able to act upon
the world, must be seen as situated in a natural order. There are
natural constraints within which an actor has to behave in society,
e.g., we need a voice to speak and a body to make gestures.
Goffman's assumption is `that, although natural events occur
without intelligent intervention, intelligent doing cannot be accom-
plished effectively without entrance into the natural order' (Goff-
man, 1974: 23). Consequently, the actor needs two kinds of
understanding: (1) the understanding of the natural world by which
he is encompassed; and (2) the understanding of the special
worlds. For this understanding, actors use primary frameworks,
both natural and social. This does not simply mean that individuals
are merely passive users of the given frameworks. They also can act
upon the world. But they act within a world that is framed, keyed or
fabricated. `Framed' means that there happens to be an 'organiza-
tion of experience ' that is given to us. By keying or fabricating, the
original framework is transposed or transformed. For example,
when two people play checkers, they have to follow the rules of the
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game that are pre-given. The same happens when these frameworks
are keyed or fabricated. For example, contests are a kind of keying
of social reality. Wrestling seems to be fighting, but the rules of the
sport of wrestling put limits on the aggressive acts. Although keying
and fabrication mean a change of the meaning of particular
frameworks as seen by the participants, they are given structure to
the keying or fabricating actors. Here, Goffman describes emerging
realities that differ from the individual construction of reality. These
structures are independent of the participants, but, nevertheless, it
must be stressed that the participants are aware of the alteration of
meaning.
From Goffman's earlier work, it can be confirmed that he
considers man and society as real. Since The Presentation of Self in
Everyday Life (1959), he has adopted both sociological nominalism
and sociological realism. The analysis of man, although using
different concepts, consolidate this opinion. He speaks about
`human' and `socialized' selves (Goffman, 1959: 56), about 'fabrica-
tor' and `character' (Goffman, 1959: 251-54; 1967: 31), each being
an active and passive part of the individual.
This individual must be studied as part of society, meeting in
social encounters, social gatherings, social situations and social
occasions (Goffman, 1967: 44, 144; 1961a: 9; 1963b: 248). All these
factors are strong socialization instruments. They are so important
that Goffman (1963b: 248) concludes at the end of Behavior in
Public Places that: `More than to any family or club, more than to
any class or sex, more than to any nation, the individual belongs to
gatherings, and he had best show that he is a good member in good
standing.'
For this reason, the interpretation by Helle (1977: 165) of
Goffman's work as an `anaskopic' approach cannot be accepted,
although it can perhaps be defended for the earlier work of
Goffman, in which the definition of the situation takes an important
place. It certainly is no longer the standpoint of Goffman when he
analyses the organization of social reality. Sociological realism and
sociological nominalism are methodologically translated into an
`anaskopic' and `kataskopic' approach.
Discussing the methodological consequences of the conception of
reality, I stressed above that, in phenomenological sociology, the
main experience we have as actors is the intentionality of the
individual actor. We do not ask for evidence about the fact that we
are placed in an organized, intersubjective everyday life-world. We
have knowledge-at-hand of this life-world. My fellow-men are
immediately given in my work and communication in the world.
Through our communication, we not only become conscious of the
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other, but also of our own characteristics. To reach others in
face-to-face relations, a stock of knowledge is given, and, to the
extent we are remote from others, we use a stock of knowledge
equipped with idealizations, i.e., types of what the others want to
do. These are expressed in linguistic typifications and recipes for
behaviour that are given to us by our predecessors. The others, like
the actor, are purpose-directed individuals who can act upon the
world.
As an individual I am aware of the social dimension of my
life-world, i.e., a society that transcends myself. This is the basis of
an `objective' order, an order that is given to me. To this objective
order belongs my subjective `meaning-context' as well as `my
subjectively experienced adumbrations and modes of apprehension'
(Schutz and Luckmann, 1974: 18).
It is in this social world that a personal self is developed. This
happens when a child gets a personal self. Since a child is situated in
a social life-world, he comes to an `intersubjective mirroring'. He
meets a world-structure that is pre-given and not invented by the
child and that appears to him as institutionalized and encompassed
in a meaning-context. This meaning-context is objectivized in
speech and institutions, which are the instruments by which a child
can become a fellow-man. There is an historical and social structure
that is met by this child `here and now' (Schutz and Luckmann,
1974: 295, 244). Institutions (e.g. language, meaning-context) are
an important part of the social world and provide knowledge about
social reality that transcends the possibilities of individual experi-
ence.
None the less, society is composed of individuals who experience
society as a pre-given structure. Society must be conceived as a
priori to the individual. Like Goffman, the individual recognizes the
emergent character of the world structure. Nevertheless, Schutz
does not agree that it is methodologically possible to know social
reality without taking into account individual intentionality.
Garfinkel speaks about man and society in almost the same way
Schutz does. A person is a motivational type, equipped with a body,
which is used to designate meaning to the environment and also to
draw meaning from others (Garfinkel, 1956: 420-21; 1967: 104-85).
As a human actor with a biography he is intentionally directed to
the world. He uses `seen but unnoticed background expectancies' as
a scheme of interpretation of the social world that is given to him as
a social system (Garfinkel, 1963, 1967). The individual has an
intersubjective orientation toward this social world which is an
organized reality, a system of rule-governed activities. These social
structures of everyday activities become observable through the
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study of common-sense knowledge and common-sense activities
(Garfinkel, 1967: 35-75). Doing this kind of research, Garfinkel,
like Schutz, opts for an approach from the individual. Most of the
experiments presented in his main work describe how persons
handle common-sense knowledge. Even if this common-sense
knowledge is known by the researcher through the individuals, it is
not considered to be merely a product of the individual but an
emergent reality. Structure is also part of Garfinkel's (1963: 188)
analysis to the extent that it is a perceived normal environment,
which is a condition for understanding accounts and at the same
time it is defined by the attitude of daily life.
Man, according to Blumer, is a human organism having a self.
And this self is not a structure but a process. By this point of view
Blumer (1969a: 62-4, 78-89) follows Mead's conception of man,
and he also agrees with Mead 's social behaviouristic approach to
man. An individual can make gestures, external acts, that acquire a
meaning in the interaction with him or herself and the other
individuals. The first thing a self does is designate objects and acts;
he gives them a meaning and judges if these objects and acts are
suitable for his subsequent actions. Having made the judgement, he
decides how to act. Because the individual can indicate something
to himself, he has the possibility of interpreting the characteristics of
the situation in which he acts. The individual becomes a very active
unity, and not just a bunch of reactions. Consequently, it makes no
sense for Blumer to look for environmental pressures, stimuli,
motives, etc., that precede the act as an explanation for the act.
What is important is to know that the individual constructs reality in
a process of symbolic interaction and that the individual forms
interpretations and acts in relation to others.
This interacting self is the kernel of all ongoing activity. An
individual meeting another individual in social interaction is the
most fundamental form of human association. Human groups
consist of interacting human beings. As a matter of fact, these
interacting human beings are not interacting `roles', but interacting
`people'. Society is thus nothing but a collection of interacting
individuals.
In spite of the stress on the individual as the composing factor of
society, Blumer does not deny the existence of a social structure in
human society. There are social roles, positions, rank order,
bureaucratic organizations, social codes, norms etc. Their function
is to help the interpretation and definition of the situations that are
at the base of `joint actions'. If people do not take into account
these structures, then the ongoing activity has no meaning at all.
But even these social structures have no life apart from the
definition given by the individuals, even in `joint actions'.
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Society can be characterized as follows: (1) it is an `ongoing
process of action - not ... a posited structure of relations'; (2)
actions must be seen as joint interactions, not as separate actions of
the participants; (3) actions have a career or history; (4) the
common definition of the joint action by the participants keeps this
career fixed; (5) but this does not mean that this career has no
uncertainties and possibilities.
Blumer clearly presents a nominalistic interpretation of society.
Although he recognizes the existence of a social structure, his
emphasis is on the paramount meaning of the individual. Take, for
example, `joint interactions' such as a marriage ceremony or a
family dinner. It is not considered to be possible to achieve joint
interaction without the interpretation given by the individuals of a
way they fit together.
The four paradigms stress the process character of man and
society. None the less, they assign different places to man and
society in the social reality and, as will be shown later, this will have
different consequences for their methodological principles.
Although none of them denies the existence of social structures,
Goffman ' s frame analysis delivers the most structuralist approach of
the three. Structure and society are more than the mere sum of the
individuals. Schutz and Garfinkel also recognize this standpoint, but
methodologically they turn back to the individual, as does Blumer.
The subject matter of sociology
Sociologists confine the subject matter of research within their
frames of the conceptions about reality, man and society. In
general, it is shown that the interest of the four has been in the
ongoing social reality and the meaningful character of this reality.
Thus, it could be expected that the definition of sociology would
present, to a certain extent, the same characteristics. Goffman
(1974: 564) states that: `The first object of social analysis ought ... to
be ordinary actual behaviour - its structure and its organization.'
Schutz (1976: 248) puts it this way: `The primary task of this science
[interpretive sociology] is to describe the processes of meaning
establishment and meaning interpretation as these are carried out
by individuals living in the social world.'
It must be stressed that Schutz (1967: 226) considers the `world of
working' as the paramount reality. Action is thus part of it.
Garfinkel (1967: 11), although speaking about ethnomethodology,
makes a similar point: ethnomethodology is `the investigation of the
rational properties of indexical expressions and other practical
actions as contingent ongoing accomplishment of organized artful
practices of everyday life'. Blumer (1969a: 55) moreover, gives a
similar description: `In a valid sense social action is the primary
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subject matter of social science. Hence, an accurate picture and
understanding of social action is of crucial importance.'
Taking into account what has been said about the visions of
reality, man and society, it is normal that the three paradigms would
try to grasp daily social action. But the option of Goffman is,
nevertheless, different: for him, the main task of sociology is to
study the social structure and social organization of actual be-
haviour. None the less, frame analysis is not about social organiza-
tion, but rather about the structure of experience. Even if Goffman
(1974: 13) puts society first, he is concerned about the individual's
current involvement'. But frame analysis also has something to say
about the structure of social action. With regard to three or four
performing individuals, frame analysis can show (1) `the tracks or
channels of activity', (2) `the laminations' and (3) `the participation
status' (Goffman, 1974: 564-5). So the focus is on social structure
(Goffman, 1974: 247).
Emphasizing the organization of ordinary actual behaviour as the
subject matter of sociology is not new for Goffman. Even when in
his earlier work he gives much attention to social psychology, there
is always an important part devoted to the organizational approach
of social action (e.g. Goffman, 1967: 2; 1961a, b; 1963b: 156, 193,
231; 1971: x, 63, 138, 362; 1981a: 84). For this reason, a formal
sociological approach in the footsteps of Simmel is not unusual
(Goffman, 1959: 15; 1967: 16, 63, 65).
However, in Frame Analysis, Goffman's main concern is not the
structure of social life, but the structure of experience. The problem
which he wants to solve is what happens when an individual
wonders what is going on. To solve this problem, our perception is
focused by the different frames, keys and fabrications. The actor
thus interprets the world using pre-given frames such as postulates,
rules, lores of understanding and approaches (Goffman, 1974: 21).
This can be seen as the basis for a sociology of knowledge.
From this point of view there is a parallel between Goffman ' s
paradigms and the three others. The study of knowledge is also a
central point in Schutz's, Garfinkel's and Blumer's work. The
former two are interested in the processes of meaning establishment
and interpretation, while the latter is involved in objects, social
action and joint interaction as defined by the actors.
The main part of Schutz's work (1932, 1967, 1964, 1975, 1974) is
devoted to the phenomenological analysis of the life-world with
much attention being given to the knowledge of the life-world and
society. It is to be noted that this is not the same as an empirical
sociology of knowledge (Schutz and Luckmann, 1974: 317-18), but
`the formal types of the social distribution of knowledge can even
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have a certain heuristic value for the empirical sociology of
knowledge'. As pointed out above, the life-world stock of know-
ledge, the social stock of knowledge and scientific knowledge meet
each other through the postulate of adequacy (Schutz, 1967: 44).
Schutz considers this as a guarantee for the consistency of the
constructs of the sociologist with common-sense knowledge. 2
Garfinkel's ethnomethodology can also be typified as a sociology
of common-sense knowledge. Although he takes Schutz's opinion
as a starting point, he changes the methods of research by using
experiments. In this way, he shows that sociologists as well as lay
people use common-sense knowledge to explain social reality
(Garfinkel, 1967: 31, 66-103). He points out that scientific
rationalities cannot replace common-sense knowledge; they can even
hinder social interaction (Garfinkel, 1967: 277-83). Ethno-
methodology can help in this way to expose the common-sense
reasoning in sociological research.
Blumer (1969a: 55-6), finally, although he is interested in social
action as constructed by the participants, looks for processes of
knowledge:
In this situation, he [the actor] notes, interprets and assesses things with
which he has to deal in order to act. The collectivity is in the same
position as the individual in having to cope with a situation, in having to
interpret and analyse the situation, and in having to construct a line of
action. Basically put, it means that in order to treat and analyse social
action one has to observe the process by which it is constructed.
One last comment is related to the general label `micro-sociological
paradigms ' . Only Garfinkel ' s work is confined to the study of
face-to-face relations or small groups, which is the core subject of
micro-sociology. Goffman speaks about such things as riots,
colleges, passengers and structures; Schutz about social collectives
and artifacts; and Blumer about social structures and joint action.
Why are these four paradigms then considered to be micro-
sociological? A common characteristic of the four is that in each the
analysis of social action starts with the interpreting individuals
acting in relation to each other in small units. Because of this
starting point, these approaches can be considered micro-
sociological.
Methodological principles
Speaking about reality and the subject matter, I argued that the four
paradigms are keenly interested in daily knowledge. In all of them,
individuals are considered to be meaning-endowed entities. As a
consequence, it could be expected that they would apply an
interpretive sociology to a certain extent, i.e., they would look for
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the aims, motives, or plans of the actors as the means of
understanding social action.
It is accepted by the four paradigms that acting individuals have
life plans, expectations, wishes, etc. Explaining social reality
consequently supposes an interpretive approach. This is a necessary
but not a sufficient condition. While Schutz (1932: 247-85),
Garfinkel (1967) and Blumer (1969a: 60, 40, 58) reduce the
methods of sociology to an understanding of the acting individuals
within a social setting, Goffman (1974: 10-11) does not consider this
approach as sufficient: `I assume that definitions of a situation are
built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern
events - at least social ones - and our subjective involvement in
them.'
Frames, keys and fabrications organize our experience in a
particular way. They are given to the actors, who do not even have
to be aware of the primary frameworks they use. Although they
may use them improperly, they can apply them effectively. Primary
frameworks are, indeed, the central part of the culture of the group.
In this respect, frameworks enable the actor to understand his world
(Goffman, 1974: 21-7). Goffman stresses a situational `verstehen ' .
Indeed, in his earlier work the idea of `definition of the situation'
takes a central position. Nevertheless, already in The Presentation
of Self in Everyday Life (1959: 254-5) he denies that social reality is
just a construction by individuals. Even if an individual wants to
present an untrue picture of himself, he is using real techniques.
Consequently, it would be wrong to confine the explanation of
social reality to the individual definition of the situation. For that
reason, contrary to the classical pragmatic standpoint, Goffman
stresses that `the meaning of an object, no doubt, is generated
through its use, as pragmatists say, but ordinarily not by particular
users' (Goffman, 1974: 39), a remarkably different standpoint from
those of Schutz and Blumer.
What are the consequences of these points of view for methodo-
logical research principles?
Scientific reasoning
Philosophy of science has designed the different patterns of
reasoning that are followed or have to be followed in scientific
research. Most researchers follow these patterns, although the
importance of imagination in finding new ways is often stressed.
The four paradigms, although not abandoning all the generally
recognized scientific principles, give proof of and demand an
important place for imagination. Schutz proposes that creativity
build up ideal types, while Blumer asks for a creative approach to
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overcome the limited possibilities of traditional research patterns.
Garfinkel uses very original experiments in which he asks the
experimenters to handle or think in deviation from the background
expectancies. Goffman ' s work is an overwhelmingly creative
presentation of frames, keys and fabrications drawing on the most
unusual sources of research, like comic strips, novels, cartoons,
biographies and the cinema. His originality does not lie in the fact
that these sources are used, but in the way he uses them.
The paradigms are different, too, as far as the general pattern of
scientific reasoning is concerned.
In general Goffman works very impressionistically. He follows no
strict pattern to collect facts; he does not worry about the
representativity of the facts; he neglects serious quantitative
argumentation to make general statements. The overall pattern is
inductive, but he gathers facts rather to illustrate than to prove a
generalization. There is no systematic falsification or verification; it
is more free-wheeling. The standpoint of Goffman (1981b: 65) - `I
would have thought it moves me farther and farther (even further
and further) in positivism' - cannot be considered to be an option
for the systematic reasoning of the positivistic researcher.
Frame Analysis consists of a long list of frames used by people
experiencing social reality. The explanation pattern used most often
is explanation-by-concept (Hempel, 1965: 453-7). In the strict
sense, this is not considered an explanation, but rather a description
of the different characteristics of a phenomenon. These are seen as
the constituent elements of a phenomenon and, in this sense, a kind
of condition. For example, let us consider keying. A key is,
the set of conventions by which a given activity, one already meaningful
in terms of some primary frameworks, is transformed into something
patterned on this activity but seen by the participants to be something
quite else. The process of transcription can be called keying. (Goffman,
1974: 43-4)
This definition is preceded by a description of the fighting of
animals, which can be done playfully. A much longer description is
then given to what keying is. It is a list of conjunctions of symptoms,
that need to be present to have a keying. One of these characteris-
tics is: `Participants in the activity are meant to know and to openly
acknowledge that a systematic alteration is involved, one that will
radically reconstitute what it is for them that is going on.' (Goffman,
1974: 45) It does not seem to me that these participants are
considered to be the causes of the keying. This is only a description
of how people are supposed to look at reality when they are keying.
The rest of the chapter, `Keys and Keying ' , is spent on the
definitions of the different keys and on illustrating them by very
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disparate examples. Even when this list seems to provide an
amazing amount of facts to support a particular key, it must not be
forgotten that Goffman (1974: 15) does not consider them as proof
or evidence, but merely as simple illustrations.
Goffman also uses other explanation patterns, one of them being
based on the dispositions of the acting individuals when they
construct fabrications (1974: 87ff.). For example, `playful deceit',
`benign fabrication', is possible because the victim accepts in good
sport to be deceived for a short time.
Nevertheless, the interest of frame analysis is mostly in the
questions of `how' and `what' and less in the question of `why'. This
is not a very unusual practice for the author, as John Lofland (1980:
31-7) has shown in analysing the earlier work of Goffman.
The standpoint of phenomenological sociology is different. This
sociological paradigm wants to observe and understand the life-
world. It explicitly chooses a subjective interpretation. This means
that the explanation must take account of the actor, not as seen by
the researcher, but by the actor himself (postulate of subjective
interpretation). As I mentioned above, the sociologist, being an
objective observer, has to build ideal types. By these ideal types,
the act of the actor can be understood by the researcher. It can also
be understood by the actor and his fellows since the act occurs in
their life-world (postulate of adequacy). An ideal type must be
constructed like the typifications used in the everyday life-world.
Moreover, an ideal type, as Weber has put it, must be both causal
and meaning-adequate. So it is not sufficient that the motives have
some meaning for the realization of the typical act, there must also
be some evidence that a meaning-adequate type has some chance of
occurring, as experience shows (Schutz, 1932: 247-85). Empirical
observation is consequently the basis for verification.
Garfinkel (1967: 77-9) also stresses observation, but uses
interpretation or the documentary methods (Mannheim) and
experiments. This documentary method takes an `actual appearance
as "the document of', as "pointing to", as "standing on behalf of' a
presupposed underlying pattern'. This actual appearance is inter-
preted within the common-sense knowledge of social structures.
Indeed, social facts, which the researcher gets within accounts or
ethnographies, are indexical and reflexive. These two characteris-
tics are conditions for interpretation. Garfinkel goes even further.
He uses the documentary method to find how understanding
happens in daily events. Therefore he uses experiments. Most of the
experiments start with a stable system and Garfinkel (1963; 1967:
36-8) tries then to create trouble by asking experimenters to act
deviantly. The aim is to show how persons interpret the new deviant
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situation in order to learn what they consider to be the normal
structure. Garfinkel is firmly convinced that these are not proper
experiments, but a kind of documentary method to aid his
imagination. They are seen more as a source of illustration than as a
proof for a thesis. Causality is not the main concern of Garfinkel; he
is more interested in how meaning is given to social reality.
On the other hand, symbolic interactionism explicitly takes an
inductive stance. The classic patterns of research, the traditional
testing of hypotheses, and the confinement to operational pro-
cedures are rejected because of their stereotyped structures. A
researcher has to return to the empirical social world, i.e., `the
actual group life of human beings' (Blumer, 1969a: 35). Hence the
researcher must bridge the distance between his life-world and that
of the studied group. Therefore, it would be best for the researcher
to become a participant of the group. Doing research means that
two steps are taken. In the first place, there is `exploration', which
means that the researcher adapts questions and methods to the
interpretation made by the life-group. In the second place, there is
`inspection ' : the task of scrutinizing the relationship between
analytical elements (i.e. general or categorical items) and empirical
reality. This method, as formulated by Blumer (1969a: 21-47),
forms an inductive sociology using facts to build up theoretical
propositions. For Blumer (1969a: 30), this includes confirmation as
well as falsification.
I have contended that the paradigms take different methodologi-
cal stances according to their ontological options, and I suggested
that scientific reasoning would follow these differences.
Goffman's frame analysis has a peculiar position in relation to this
problem. If we agree that he is moving closer to positivism
(Goffman, 1981b: 65), it could be expected he would pay more
attention to inductive thinking. And, in a certain sense, he does, but
the main thrust of his argument is an enumeration of concepts and
illustrations that can be used to recognize structures.
Theory
Theory is a very ambiguous concept in methodology. It can be
considered as a universal proposition explaining facts, or as a law,
an hypothesis or something in between. The function of theory is
also variously defined. This makes it difficult to give an assessment
of whether frame analysis, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethod-
ology or phenomenological sociology have attained theory status.
Here I would ask only: what is theory according to the three
paradigms?
If more attention in Frame Analysis is paid to explanations-by-
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concept, it might be expected that little would be said of laws and
theories. None the less, Goffman (1974: 14) wants `to construct
general statements', which was not his aim in Relations in Public
(1971: xiv). Here he does not want to produce absolute or statistical
generalizations. He prefers to speak about practices occurring
`routinely', `often' or `on occasion'. Moreover, he is aware that his
analysis is confined to Western society, and more particularly to
Anglo-American society, in which he pays more attention to
middle-class behaviour (Goffman, 1961b: 182; 1963b: 5; 1971: xiv,
40, 75, 382; 1974: 521-2) than to any other category. He does not
deny class differences (Goffman, 1961a: 50; 1963b: 206), but it is
not his primary intention to contribute to class analysis (Goffman,
1974: 14).
Relying on a vast number of illustrations and his creative
analytical power, he makes many general statements in Frame
Analysis. For example:
When the individual in our Western society recognizes a particular
event, he tends, whatever else he does, to imply in this response (and in
effect employ) one or more frameworks or schemata of interpretation of
a kind that can be called primary ...
When no keying is involved, when, that is, only primary perspectives
apply, response in frame terms is not likely unless doubt needs
combating, as in the reply: `No, they're not merely playing; it's a real
fight' ...
The more vulnerable the dominant participant to deviant subordinate
response, the more selection apparently there is in regard to subordin-
ates ...
When more generalizations have accumulated concerning face-to-face
interaction, there will be greater resources to draw upon for intention-
ally unhinging the frame of ordinary events. (Goffman, 1974: 21, 46,
429, 495.)
Statements of this kind are numerous, also in the earlier work
(Lofland, 1980: 33-4), but they are rarely the product of a
systematic collection of corroborating facts.
As a totality, however, frame analysis seems to make the general
statement that, as a rule, individuals use a mixture of classified
frames. Even though the list of frames is not exhaustive, we all use
them when answering the question of what it is that is going on.
According to phenomenological sociology, theory is one of the
main concerns of a sociologist. Theory means, `the explicit
formulation of determinate relations between a set of variables in
terms of which a fairly extensive class of empirically ascertainable
regularities can be explained' (Schutz, 1967: 52) .
The universality and the predictive value of these theories is
rather restricted. But even though these generalizations have their
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limitations, they do have a certain nomothetic value. Ideal types
are, indeed, constructed in perfect anonymity and, in this way, tell
how this typical actor acts in general.
Because the scientifically ideal types must be built in conformity
with an everyday and social stock of knowledge, Schutz (1967: 59)
considers it necessary to detect the general principles by which an
actor grasps his everyday life-world. For this reason, all the general
statements made in relation to the knowledge of the life-world and
society are of importance for constructing a sociological theory
(Schutz and Luckmann, 1974).
Symbolic interactionism is as outspoken as phenomenological
sociology. Blumer (1969a: 140) sees the purpose of theory as the
development of analytical schemes of the empirical world. But
theory has too long been considered to be a result of empirical
research with no notice being given to the way empirical facts are
approached in enquiry. It must be seen as a result of a dialectical
process: `Theory, inquiry and empirical fact are interwoven in a
texture of operations with theory guiding inquiry, inquiry seeking
and isolating facts, and facts affecting theory.' (Blumer, 1969a:
141.)
For this reason the empirical reality must be stressed and
concepts must be reconsidered in close relation with reality:
`sensitizing' concepts have to be used.
Garfinkel approaches classical sociological theory as critically as
does Blumer. He borrows from Schutz for his analysis, but expands
the methods. He refuses to accept that common-sense knowledge
and activities are just assumed, but makes it an issue of inquiry. He
shows that a sociological researcher or theorist assumes common-
sense knowledge and presuppositions to explain social phenomena,
to interpret answers of questionnaires, biographies, folders, and
so on.
Concepts
Frame analysis, phenomenological sociology and symbolic interac-
tion speak about concepts as the sacred instruments for research.
The nature of these concepts differs in all three paradigms, and so
their functions differ.
Like Goffman's earlier work, Frame Analysis is a brilliant
construct of concepts concerning the structure of experience, but it
is more a taxonomy than a theory. As typifications of what is going
on in daily life, these concepts are closely related to everyday
language, and most of his definitions are illustrated by large
numbers of examples.
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For many concepts he relies on the definitions given by other
authors, without always taking into account their methodological
options. For example, `social selves' of W. James (Goffman, 1959:
48), `rules of irrelevance' of H. Garfinkel, `frame' of G. Bateson,
`sociability' of G. Simmel, `bureaucracy' of M. Weber and T.
Parsons, `role-set' of Merton, `role-sectors' of N. Gross and others,
`profane' and `sacred' of Durkheim (Goffman, 1961a: 19, 21, 22, 87,
152), `eye-to-eye looks' of Simmel (Goffman, 1963b: 93), 'inter-
change' of E.D. Chapple, `ideal sphere' and `adventure' of Simmel
(Goffman, 1967: 19, 62, 162), `strategic interaction' of T.C.
Schelling (Goffman, 1969: 100), `interaction synchrony' of W.S.
Condon, `prestation' of M. Maus, `round' and `exchange' of H.
Sacks (Goffman, 1971: 52, 62, 119).
Rarely does he make a comparative analysis of the concepts
before proposing a new construct, like he does in.the chapter `Role
Distance', in his book, Encounters (1961a). These concepts have the
form of Weberian ideal types. Some of these stress the motivational
aspect. This is the case for make-believe, experiments, fabrications
and benign fabrications, to cite only a few (Goffman, 1974: 48, 73,
83, 87). Other concepts concern how something is seen by the
actors, e.g., keying, performance, cosmological interest, fortuitous-
ness and demonstration (Goffman, 1974: 43-4, 124, 30, 33, 66). As
a totality, they delineate the different perspectives from which
social reality is met by actors in the world and describe a pre-given
structure of the experience of daily life.
Often these concepts are part of typologies, as can be seen when
frames, keys and fabrications were presented. Goffman does not
consider these typologies as an exhaustive description of the
phenomena, but as a result of `a caricature of systematic sampling'.
Moreover, these types seem to be postulates and not assertions to
be proven or tested (Lofland, 1980: 30).
The conceptualization in phenomenological sociology develops
directly along the line of Weberian ideal types. I have had occasion
to mention this above with regard to scientific reasoning and theory.
While the homunculi (= ideal types) must be built adequate to
everyday knowledge and to the social stock of knowledge, the
significance of pre-scientific knowledge for sociology has to be
stressed. Schutz and Luckmann (1974: 306-31) give a good example
of this in relation to the study of professionalization. The types, i.e.
the layman, the well-informed and the expert, form an interesting
starting point for further research.
Few sociologists have so forcefully drawn attention to the
mistakes made in the construction and application of concepts as
Blumer (1969a: 153-82). In his opinion, traditional empirical
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sociology uses concepts erroneously. Scientific concepts need a
particular degree of abstraction, but they must be meticulously
scrutinized in close relation to social life. For Blumer (1969a:
147-8), scientific concepts are `sensitizing' and not `definitive', only
providing general orientations for the researcher. In this respect,
they make possible new orientations and new experiences in social
research.
Like Blumer, Garfinkel stresses that concepts, sentences, utter-
ances, etc., must be considered in close connection with the setting
in which they are used. The meaning of concepts is consequently not
fixed, but depends on the context in which they are employed. Each
account must be interpreted taking into account the indexicality of
the expressions. In addition he employs ideal types as does Schutz
(Garfinkel, 1967: 106, 263). But here again, their meaning is
determined by the context in which they are placed. Concepts are
thus not just research instruments but are to be scrutinized.
Methods
In view of the different methodological standpoints of the four
paradigms, it could be expected that their research methods would
differ. Although, in principle, most of the usual research techniques
are considered to be useful, there is much criticism of the
conventional survey and experimental methods. None of the four
sociologists uses the conventional methods in the traditional way.
If Goffman ' s option for positivism is taken seriously, Frame
Analysis involves a very unorthodox approach. He ignores systema-
tic gathering of data to verify hypotheses and build theories.
Moreover, the facts used in Frame Analysis differ considerably from
traditional sociological data. Field-work, as such, is not used,
although some of Goffman's examples come from participant
observation. Instead, Goffman (1974: 15; 1971: xiv; 1976: 24) works
with illustrations found in popular books, newspapers, novels, the
cinema, comics and theatres etc., and he admits that it is `a
caricature of systematic sampling'. For this reason, it does not
matter whether his stories are reliable or not. This point of view is
acceptable if the aim is to give a limited description of the structure
of experience. If not, the selection of the examples would limit the
capacity of frame analysis to find all the possible structures.
Goffman sees himself as an `ethnographer of small entities'.
Being a student of Lloyd Warner and E.C. Hughes, he was trained
to do this kind of work. But the major part of his work, and
certainly Frame Analysis, is not a product of direct observation. He
performed field work only three times: a study of a small
community on the Shetland Islands (Communication Conduct in an
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Island Community, 1953), a study of a mental health hospital
(Asylums, 1961b) and an unpublished study about behaviour in
casinos. Like Frame Analysis, most of his work relies on illustra-
tions, gathered from personal experience, and the haphazardly
collected strips of reality presented in true or fictitious stories of
novels, films, research reports etc. The selection of this material
happened `over the years on a hit-or-miss basis using principles of
selection mysterious to me' (Goffman, 1974: 15). Sometimes he
does have a pattern to collect facts, like the ethology in Relations in
Public (1971) or game theory in Strategic Interaction (1969).
The use of ideal types in phenomenological sociology demands a
study of the everyday life-world as it appears to the actor, and the
main method in Schutz's work is phenomenological analysis of the
life-world of the actor. Good examples of this are found in his
papers `The Homecomer' and `The Stranger' (Schutz, 1964:
91-119). The attempt to imagine what life in the everyday life-world
is like seems to be the main research technique, and it must be
augmented by empirical observation.
Garfinkel has a similar position, i.e. ethnography and accounts
are the main methods of data collection in ethnomethodology.
These phenomena are approached interpretatively as seen by the
members of society. To facilitate this approach, Garfinkel uses
experiments, but in a way totally different from that of the main
tradition. In these experiments, the experimenters are mostly
students who are not chosen in function of a representative picture
of the problem. Very often they are not trained for the experiment
and are given no clear rules to write the accounts. The experimen-
ters also use interviewing, but their objectives are different from the
conventional interview techniques. Even when Garfinkel counts the
distribution of the phenomena, they can be considered only as
illustrations for a particular interpretation of social reality; he is not
concerned about the representativity of his material. Like Goffman,
Garfinkel uses also ethnography, but, because of his typical
ethnomethodological standpoint, the points of interest are com-
pletely different.
The ongoing social life, according to the symbolic interactionist,
cannot be grasped by classic scientific procedures, which destroy the
possibility of getting valid information about the empirical world.
The researcher has to come as close as possible to the object. This
can be done by becoming an observant participant who explores and
inspects. For exploration all kinds of techniques are allowed, such
as direct observation, interviews, listening to conversations, life
histories, letters and diaries and group discussion. The particular
method to be used cannot be determined in advance but has to be
adapted in the course of the project.
Verhoeven 97
Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter is not to evaluate the four paradigms.
To do this properly the explanatory power of each approach to
particular problems would have to be evaluated. But the works of
the four authors are too divergent to do this. Whether the frames
analysed in Frame Analysis give an adequate picture of the
structures of experience can be answered only empirically. But this
was not the aim of this chapter.
In spite of the specificity of the paradigms, it is obvious that `the
basic frameworks of understanding available in our society for
making sense out of events' (Goffman, 1974: 10) are embryonically
recognizable in Schutz's social stock of knowledge and Garfinkel's
common-sense knowledge of social structures. The epistemological
base is, of course, different, but the study of structural phenomena
is clearly part of phenomenological sociology and ethnomethod-
ology.
I have suggested that differences in the world pictures would
reveal different methodological options. Frame analysis appears as
a positivistically inspired reaction against the solipsism of other
micro-sociological paradigms. Reality does not live just in the minds
of the knowing individuals. Reality is a given and can be recognized
as such. Although phenomenological sociology, ethnomethodology
and symbolic interactionism try hard to escape the label of
solipsism, the knowing subject is undeniably the central source of
knowledge for these paradigms.
From an ontological perspective, Goffman stresses the emergent
character of society and the ongoing identity of man. Society and
the individual are also assigned an important place in the sociology
of Schutz and Garfinkel, although they bracket the existence of the
world, while Blumer reduces social life to the joint interaction of
individuals. Thus, the structural approach is of central concern for
both frame analysis and phenomenological sociology, as well as for
ethnomethodology.
In spite of these differences the programmes of the four
paradigms are similar: they all want to study `ongoing social action';
they all start from face-to-face interactions, but they do not confine
the study to small groups, with the exception of Garfinkel; and they
develop a base for a sociology of everyday knowledge.
From the methodological standpoint, there are big differences
between frame analysis, phenomenological sociology, ethnometho-
dology and symbolic interactionism. Frame analysis can be char-
acterized as an approach that is more interested in answering the
questions of `how' and `what', rather than `why'. Theory is reduced
to generalizations that are formulated on the basis of a selection of
illustrations. For the description of the different frames, a vast list of
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concepts is created, in which very often the personal motivation of
the actor is considered. The fact-gathering is haphazard, which is
justified by the structural interest.
Taking into account the ontological perspectives, it is shown that
a subjective interpretation from the standpoint of the actor is the
concern of the three other paradigms. All three stress observation,
but are highly critical of the conventional survey and experimental
methods, although the arguments are different. There is no concern
for representative observation; collected facts are rather illustra-
tions. Using this kind of experience, Schutz and Garfinkel show the
meaning of common-sense knowledge for scientific reasoning,
Blumer is more interested in interacting individuals. Concepts are
used differently. Schutz and Garfinkel apply ideal types, Blumer
`sensitive' concepts, and Garfinkel pays much attention to the
meaning of concepts in relation to the social setting.
Whatever the epistemological standpoint of the critic may be, it
cannot be denied that frame analysis delivers a brilliant description
of the structure of our experience. This structural approach was
already present in Goffman's earlier works, although less pro-
nounced. None of the three other paradigms has produced anything
similar, although there is a basis for this structural approach in
Schutz's analysis of the social stock of knowledge and Garfinkel's
work. This approach is important because it puts structural analysis
back into the study of small groups, and creates interest for frames,
structures and organizations, rather than for interaction.
Notes
This article is an expansion of the paper presented under the same title at the
symposium 'Revisions and relations among modern micro-sociological paradigms' of
the Tenth World Congress of Sociology, Mexico, August 1982. I am grateful for the
critical remarks of Joan Aldous, Karel Dobbelaere, Horst J. Helle, Tamotsu
Shitbutani and Dominique Vancraeynest.
1. We do not consider here the symbolic interactionism of Manford Kuhn, which
takes different stances on various points.
2. The postulate of adequacy is actually a deus ex machina. Indeed, how is it
possible, that a sociologist who approaches society as a 'world of mere contempor-
aries' and never as a world of 'fellow-men' can ever get a picture of his fellow-men?
For Schutz, the solution is to be found in the ideal types.
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It is eighteen years since the publication of Garfinkel's Studies in
Ethnomethodology. One understanding of this passage of time is
that ethnomethodology (written hereafter as EM) has developed
from being an unruly child (duly chastized by such elders as James
Coleman and Lewis Coser) to being a middle-aged bore, about
whom Sherri Cavan asked, in the title of a session at the 1983 Pacific
Sociological Association meetings, `Where have all the ethno-
methodologists gone?'
The issue is not, to put it properly, something called EM, but
rather the activity of a group of practitioners who identify their
practice as EM. In response to Cavan's question, I know colleagues
who have, to various extents, identified themselves as ethnometho-
dologists who are getting out of EM in terms of self-identification,
but at the same time they are doing work which takes its auspice
from ideas formulated in the activity of EM. My title is designed to
suggest both the need for a movement of sociological thought out of
(away from) EM, and also the persistence in future sociological
work of ideas in some sense out of (derivative from) EM.
EM at eighteen, to use that metaphor a little longer, is most
appropriately understood as in an adolescent separation crisis:
going, `out of' (or, in EM terms, `doing "out of"') is a complicated
process. The complication, in the case of EM practitioners as in that
of many adolescents, revolves round the conflict between the
feeling that it is time to move on and, opposed to this, a sense of
debt to what is being left and a need to acknowledge that debt. To
.reflect on and thus facilitate the going `out of' process, this paper
begins with an acknowledgement of what EM has been and then
uses EM to introduce a yet more unruly infant, the `deconstruction'
of Jacques Derrida. A deconstructionist critique of EM suggests
both why it is time to get out, as well as why future work will always
be, in some sense, ethnomethodological.
Acknowledging ethnomethodology
At this point in the paper, some readers might expect me to define,
or at least circumscribe, EM and to do this by listing certain of its
